We analyze the political stability of capital funded social security. In particular, using a stylized theoretical framework we study the mechanisms behind governments capturing pension assets in order to lower current taxes. This is followed by an analysis of the analogous mechanisms in a
fully- edged overlapping generations model with intra-cohort heterogeneity. Funding is efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense. Individuals vote on capturing the accumulated pension assets and replacing the funded pension pillar with a pay-as-you-go scheme. We show that even if capturing assets reduces welfare in the long run, it always has sufficient political support from those alive at the moment of the vote.

Netspar, Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement, is een denktank en kennisnetwerk. Netspar is gericht op een goed geïnformeerd pensioendebat.

MEER OVER NETSPAR


Missie en strategie           •           Netwerk           •           Organisatie           •          Magazine
Netspar Brief            •            Werkprogramma 2019-2023           •           Onderzoekagenda

OVER NETSPAR

Onze partners

B20220412_SPIN_logo+naam_2xPMS_2_voettekst
B20160708_universiteit leiden
B20160708_asr
BPL_Pensioen_logo+pay-off - 1610-1225 v1.1_grijswaarden
B20220329_sph huisartsen
Bekijk al onze partners