This paper is mainly focusing on the evolution of cooperation, in particular the principle of the indirect reciprocity. And it is based on an experimental cooperation game, which is designed to study indirect reciprocity exclusively and the strategic reputation building up. Our experiment demonstrates that by providing additionalsecond-order information, the cooperation rate does increase. The second-order information offers individuals more possibilities to justify the action and reputation.Players still tend to adopt image scoring or strict discriminator strategy during the game rather than the standing strategy, which might be triggered by the large demand of memory capacity on information storage and recall. The tendency of justifiablecooperation has been performed though due to the fact that the strategy people adopt is more likely to share the definition of goodness in three common features: giving to ‘good’ as ‘good’, not giving to ‘good’ is ‘bad’, and not giving to ‘bad’ as ‘bad’. Eventhough people tend to use both first- and second-order information, the accurate information storage in the memory and recall for the second-order information is rather difficult and invisible. Behavior and intuition shown from the post questionnaires indicates consistent results derived from actual action people taken during the experiment – more likely to make information storage and recall whenthere is only first-order information comparing with the full information condition.