In testing moral hazard and tax benefit hypotheses regarding defined benefit plan funding and contribution incentives by incorporating sponsors’ bankruptcy risk, the authors proposed that high-bankruptcy-risk sponsors have a strong moral hazard incentive because the put value of the U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation guarantee is high. For low-bankruptcy-risk sponsors, the put value is low; maximizing tax benefits associated with pension contributions becomes a powerful incentive. Results based on sponsors’ voluntary contributions support both hypotheses.

Netspar, Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement, is een denktank en kennisnetwerk. Netspar is gericht op een goed geïnformeerd pensioendebat.

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