Testing moral hazard and tax benefit hypotheses: Evidence from pension plan contributions

  • Ting Zhang Ting Zhang
  • Tong Yu Tong Yu
  • Xuanjuan Chen Xuanjuan Chen

In testing moral hazard and tax benefit hypotheses regarding defined benefit plan funding and contribution incentives by incorporating sponsors’ bankruptcy risk, the authors proposed that high-bankruptcy-risk sponsors have a strong moral hazard incentive because the put value of the U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation guarantee is high. For low-bankruptcy-risk sponsors, the put value is low; maximizing tax benefits associated with pension contributions becomes a powerful incentive. Results based on sponsors’ voluntary contributions support both hypotheses.

Netspar, Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement, is a thinktank and knowledge network. Netspar is dedicated to promoting a wider understanding of the economic and social implications of pensions, aging and retirement in the Netherlands and Europe.


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